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A modified lattice gas model is proposed to study pedestrian evacuation from a single room. The
payoff matrix in this model represents the complicated interactions between selfish individuals, and
the mean force imposed on an individual is given by considering the impacts of neighborhood payoff,
walls, and defector herding. Each passer-by moves to his selected location according to the Fermi
function, and the average velocity of pedestrian flow is defined as a function of the motion rule.
Two pedestrian types are included: cooperators, who adhere to the evacuation instructions; and
defectors, who ignore the rules and act individually. It is observed that the escape time increases
with the panic level, and the system remains smooth for a low panic level, but exhibits three stages
for a high panic level. We prove that the panic level determines the dynamics of this system, and
the initial density of cooperators has a negligible impact. The system experiences three phases, a
single phase of cooperator, a mixed two-phase pedestrian, and a single phase of defector sequentially
as the panic level upgrades. The phase transition has been proven basically robust to the changes
of empty site contribution, wall’s pressure, and noise amplitude in the motion rule. It is further
shown that pedestrians derive the greatest benefit from overall cooperation, but are trapped in the
worst situation if they are all defectors.
PACS numbers: 87. 23. Ge, 02. 50. Le, 87. 23. Cc, 89. 90. +n
I. INTRODUCTION
Evacuation of pedestrians under panic has been exten-
sively studied [1–20], because an understanding of the
dynamic features of this phenomenon can reduce the in-
cidence of injury and death. Escape panic can occur in
different confinement sizes ranging from a rioting crowd
in a packed stadium to stunned customers in a bar. Es-
cape panic is characterized by strong contact interactions
between selfish individuals that quickly give rise to herd-
ing, stampede, and clogging [21–31]. Experimental ob-
servations and numerical simulations are two approaches
that have been widely applied to study this issue. Simu-
lation results have revealed some interesting dynamic fea-
tures, such as pedestrian arch formation around the exit,
herding, and interference between arches in multiple-exit
rooms [2]. Disruptive interference, self-organized queu-
ing, and scale-free escape dynamics [26, 27] have also
been observed. Experiments in genuine escape panic are
difficult to set up because of ethical and legal concerns.
However, escape panic can be simulated by solving a
set of coupled differential equations [2, 3] or by applying
the cellular automata (CA) technique [20, 26], whereby
the movement of confined pedestrians is tracked over
time. An important task related to evacuation simula-
tions is how to describe the effects of subjective factors,
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such as fear, as well as the complicated forces among
individuals. Helbing used social force to simulate such
interactions [2], and Fukui avoided force concepts by
applying the CA model [20]. Game theory was pro-
posed to study the dynamics in crows evacuation [32–37].
Helio¨vaarawe presented a spatial game theoretic model
for pedestrian behavior in situations of exit congestion
[32], and Hao etal applied game theory to deal with the
conflicts that arise when two pedestrians try to occupy
the same position[37].
In this study, we modify the model [38] in which the
effects of walls and defector herding are considered. A
defector herding unit is defined as a group of four indi-
viduals who are all defectors in the same neighborhood.
The potential well energy or mean force imposed on an
individual is defined by considering three aspects. An
individual will move to his selected location with a large
probability if his personal energy is higher than the po-
tential well energy. The velocity of a walker is defined as
a function of the motion rule, and average velocity of the
pedestrian system can reflect different dynamics, such as
smooth flow, and congestion. We find that the panic level
is crucial in determining the dynamics of the evacuation
system and the competition between cooperators and de-
fectors. It is also observed that three phases of pedestrian
are exhibited sequentially as panic level upgrades.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the model. Our numerical simu-
lations and analysis are presented in Section III. Conclu-
sions are drawn in Section IV.
2II. MODEL
Pedestrian evacuation is studied on a model of square
lattice on which all the individuals are distributed uni-
formly. Two pedestrian types are considered: coopera-
tors, who adhere to the evacuation instructions; and de-
fectors, who ignore the rules and act individually. Each
pedestrian only interacts with his nearest neighbors, and
is deleted from the system if he arrives at the exit. We
apply game theory, and the payoff matrix representing
the interactions among the crowd is shown in Table 1.
To be specific, a cooperator receives a Reward (R) when
he interacts with a collaborative neighbor, but suffers a
Sucker (S) if he encounters a defector who gains a payoff
of Temptation (T ). Two defectors receive the Punish-
ment (PM), respectively. In addition, a walker will gain
a payoff e (0 < e < R) if there is an empty site in his
neighborhood. Usually, T = 1 + r, R = 1, S = 1 − r,
PM = 0, where 0 < r < 1. r is cost-to-benefit ratio
indicating the defector-cooperator payoff divide, which
describes the panic level during the escape. e = R/2 is
set in this model.
TABLE I. Payoff matrix
C D E
C (R, R) (S, T) (e, −)
D (T, S) (PM, PM) (e, −) a
a C indicates an individual who cooperates, and D indicates an
individual who chooses to defect. E represents an empty site.
T > R > S > PM
P x denotes the personal energy of individual x, and
is the average of cumulative payoff that x receives from
all his neighbors. Each individual stays in a potential
well which is formed by the neighboring people and walls
(if walls exist in his neighborhood). Ux is the energy of
potential well x stays in, which consists of three parts.
Firstly, Up is the average cumulative payoff for all neigh-
bors of x, which represents the mean forces on x:
Up =
1
Gx
∑
j∈Gx
P xj (1)
where Gx is the scale of the interacting group centered
on x, which is defined as the number of directly linked
neighbors of x (excluding the empty sites). P xj is the
average of cumulative payoff that j receives from all his
neighbors, where individual j belongs to the neighbor-
hood of x.
A defector herding unit is defined as a group in which
four defectors are in the same neighborhood (Fig. 1). We
consider that a defector herding unit contributes PD =
T/4 to the energy of the potential well for a cooperator,
but contributes 0 to the energy of the potential well for
FIG. 1. Schematic presentation of a defector herding unit in
which all the individuals are defectors who are circled in the
figure. PD is the average payoff of the defector centered in
the circle.
a defector. Therefore, the potential well energy Ux will
include Udu if a defector herding unit exists in a defector’s
neighborhood:
Udu =
1
Gx
(ndu ·
T
4
) · s, (2)
where ndu is the number of defector herding units in the
neighborhood of x. The parameter s takes the value s = 0
if x chooses to cooperate, and s = 1 when x decides to
defect.
In addition, we consider the contribution of walls to
Ux, so Ux will include Uw if walls exist in the neighbor-
hood of x:
Uw =
1
Gx
· nw · Uw, (3)
where nw is the number of walls in the neighborhood
and Uw (0 < Uw < R) is the contribution of a wall to
Ux. Combining all the quantities discussed above, the
potential well energy Ux is given by
Ux = Up + Udu + Uw, (4)
It should be noted that x′s personal energy is excluded in
Ux which actually reflects the pressures from x
′s neigh-
borhood.
At each time step, toward the exit’s position, each in-
dividual x randomly selects a cell y in the neighborhood,
and moves to y with probability W [38]:
W =
1
1 + exp(−(P x − Ux)/κ)
, (5)
where κ is the noise amplitude. κ = 0 indicates deter-
mined occupation, whereas κ =∞ denotes stochastic oc-
cupation. It is apparent that the larger P x is, the larger
W is. The equation (5) means that if x owns more per-
sonal energy than the potential well energy, x will move
to his selected location with a larger probability. If x
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FIG. 2. Escape time as a function of the panic level r at the
initial density of cooperators ρIC = 0.5.
takes the place of y, then the individual ever occupied y
will be pushed back to the original location of x.
Since equation [5] can reflect the motion velocity of an
individual, v is defined as the system’s average velocity
and given by,
v =
1
NM
∑
j∈NM
Wj , (6)
where NM is the number of individuals who have the
escape ability, and Wj is the value of W of individual
j representing its motion velocity. Different collective
patterns of motion can be predicted according to v: for
v > 0.5, the system is realized to stay in the free flow;
when v → 0 the congestion forms. For 0 < v < 0.5, no
distinct collective patterns emerge.
All the individuals will update their strategies syn-
chronously by studying a more successful neighbor with
a probability W (sx → sy),
W (sx → sy) =
1
1 + exp(−(P y − P x)/τ)
, (7)
where τ is the noise level having the identical function of
κ in equation [5], and sx (sy) is the strategy x (y) adopts.
III. SIMULATIONS AND ANALYSIS
The simulations are carried out on a square lattice rep-
resenting a single room with a scale of 50× 50, and 2000
pedestrians are considered. Only one exit exists, at a
site range of 23 − 26 on the lattice. Initially, all the
pedestrians are distributed uniformly in the room with
a cooperation density of ρIC = 0.5. Escape is realized
successfully when 95% of the pedestrians have escaped
from the room. We set Uw = R/2 and κ = τ = 0.1. In
all of the simulations, each data point is the average for
100 realizations.
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FIG. 3. Competition of cooperators and defectors for dif-
ferent panic levels of r at ρIC = 0.5 (UP), and Competition
between cooperators and defectors for different values of ρIC
at r = 0.65 (DOWN).
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FIG. 4. Pedestrian phase transition with panic level r when
the initial cooperation density ρIC = 0.5. ρC on the vertical
coordinate is cooperation density among the pedestrians in
the room when 95% of pedestrians have escaped out of the
room. rd is the critical value at which defectors emerge, and
rc is the critical value after which cooperators become extinct.
4Figure 2 shows the variation in escape time with panic
level r at ρIC = 0.5. It is obviously seen that the escape
time remains constant for small values of r (r < 0.5),
but increases with r for r ≥ 0.5. The results indicate
that remaining calm is always the best strategy during
escape, whereas too much fear leads to a longer escape
time.
In order to understand the dynamics, interactions be-
tween cooperators and defectors are investigated. Differ-
ent features are shown for different values of r (see it in
Fig. 3 (UP)): (1) for r = 0.1 and 0.5, cooperators domi-
nate; (2) for r = 0.65, cooperators and defectors coexist
and over time their frequencies reach almost identical lev-
els; and (3) for r = 0.9, defectors dominate the system.
In Fig. 3 (DOWN), it is noted that cooperators coexist
with defectors, and evolve to eventually reach almost the
same mutual frequency, regardless of ρIC . Combining
this with the result in Fig. 3 (UP), we can conclude that
the panic level r remarkably affects the system dynamics,
whereas ρIC has no distinct impact.
The simulation results can be explained by analyzing
the panic level. It is known from the payoff matrix that
a high panic level induces a strong temptation to defect.
According to the definitions of the potential well energy
and motion rule in Equations (1)− (5), a large increment
in the percentage of defectors will lead to a relatively
large increase in potential well energy or strong pressure,
which accordingly reduces the escape velocity.
Moreover, pedestrian phase transition with panic level
r is discussed in Fig. 4. We observe that the system
experiences three phases sequentially: a single phase of
cooperator for r < 0.6, a mixed two-phase pedestrian
of cooperator and defector for 0.6(rd) ≤ r ≤ 0.7(rc),
and a single phase of defector for r > 0.7. It has been
proven that as e increases from 0.1 to 0.9, rd = 0.6089,
the standard deviation is σ(rd) = 0.0105; rc = 0.7044,
and σ(rc) = 0.0088. As Uw increases from 0.1 to
0.9, rd = 0.5956, σ(rd) = 0.0133; rc = 0.7111, and
σ(rc) = 0.0105. It is obviously seen that the phase transi-
tion is basically robust to the changes of e and Uw, which
is consistent with the results shown in Fig. 4. Further-
more, noise effect κ (in equation 5) was also studied:
when κ = 0.001 (approaching determined occupation),
rd = 0.58, rc = 0.7; for κ = 100 (approaching stochastic
occupation), rd = 0.54, and rc = 0.72. It is concluded
that phase transition is also basically robust to the noise,
but the interval of mixed phase becomes broader when
noise becomes very large.
To uncover the competition mechanism between the
two types of pedestrians, mean payoffs of cooperators
and defectors along the boundary are studied in Fig. 5.
It is observed that in the phase of r < 0.6, P c−bound is
significantly higher than P d−bound, whereas in the phase
of r > 0.7, P d−bound is obviously higher. During the
phase of 0.6 ≤ r ≤ 0.7, P d−bound keeps a little higher,
but approaches to P c−bound as time evolves. Cooperator
cluster is proven crucial in cooperation spread because
of its firm boundary. According to the results in Fig. 5,
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FIG. 5. (Color online) The differences between mean payoffs
of cooperators and defectors along the boundary (P c−bound−
P d−bound) at ρIC = 0.5 for different panic levels of r.
t1
t4
t2
t3
FIG. 6. (Color online) Spatial evolutions of cooperators and
defectors at ρIC = 0.5, and r = 0.65. The black symbols
represent empty sites, the brown ones indicate the defectors,
and the white symbols denote cooperators.
it can be induced that cooperator cluster’s boundary be-
comes weaker as panic level r upgrades. Figure 6 shows
the spatial evolution of pedestrians at r = 0.65, in which
the black symbols indicate the empty sites, the brown
ones denote the defectors, and the white symbols repre-
sent cooperative pedestrians. It is seen that since defec-
tors’ boundary is slightly firmer than cooperators’ (see
Fig. 5 in the phase of 0.6 ≤ r ≤ 0.7), many cooperator
clusters are formed but don’t spread all over the system.
The evolution of the average velocity v for different
panic levels r at ρIC = 0.5 is shown in Fig. 7. It is seen
that the average velocity decreases as the panic level in-
creases, and declines sharply for r > 0.65. It is worthy
noting that v changes slowly with t for r < 0.65, but
when r > 0.65, the velocity sharply decreases over time
until the system enters a uniform motion state. This
decrease in velocity is likely to be closely related to the
emergence of congestion, and the uniform-motion state
corresponds to free flow (moderate or relatively high ve-
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FIG. 7. Evolution of average velocity v at ρIC = 0.5 for
different values of panic level r. v∗ = 0.5, I , II , and III
represent three stages a system experiences when r > 0.65.
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FIG. 8. Variation of escape time with the initial density of
cooperators ρIC at r = 0.6.
locity) or congestion (very low velocity). Therefore, from
the phase aspect we can conclude that the system gen-
erally remains in a free-flow state for phase of r < 0.6
when t < tc (v > v∗), and then moves at a relative low
speed without distinct collective patterns. It exhibits
three behavior stages for phase of r > 7: in stage I,
local free flow and congestion coexist; in stage II, only
congestion exists; and in stage III, congestion evacuation
occurs. Congestion emerges before the system enters the
uniform state owing to the small value for v in stage II.
It can be predicted from this analysis that the probabil-
ity of congestion is high for a high panic level. For the
phase of coexistence (0.6 ≤ r ≤ 7), no distinct collective
patterns happen.
Finally, Figure 8 shows the escape time as a function of
ρIC for r = 0.6. It is presented that pedestrians gain the
greatest benefit for overall cooperation (ρIC = 1), while
the worst-case scenario occurs if all individuals defect
(ρIC = 0). The initial density of cooperators (0 < ρIC <
1) has no obvious influences on the escape time.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Extending the model proposed in previous work, we
considered the effects of defector herding and walls to in-
vestigate pedestrian evacuation. Payoff represented the
complicated interactions among individuals and was in-
cluded in the energy representation. We found that the
escape time increased with the panic level, and three
phases of pedestrian were observed sequentially as panic
level upgraded. Analysis of the results indicated that
a high panic level induced a strong temptation to de-
fect, which leaded to the emergence of widespread de-
fection. Furthermore, a large percentage of defectors in-
duced a comparatively large increase in potential well
energy, which reduced the average speed of pedestrian
flow according to the motion rule. Payoffs of cooperators
and defectors along the boundary were investigated, and
the results revealed the competition mechanisms between
the two types of pedestrian. The average velocity was de-
fined as the mean of cumulative motion probability in this
model, which revealed valuable and interesting dynam-
ics: the system was in the free flow when the panic level
was low, but exhibited three stages - congestion forma-
tion, congestion, and congestion evacuation - for a high
panic level. We proved that the panic level played an im-
portant part in determining the dynamics for which dif-
ferent behaviors were observed for different panic levels.
Phase transition existed, and was basically robust to the
changes of empty site contribution, wall’s pressure and
noise effect. We also found that global cooperation was
the best strategy for the most efficient evacuation, and
the situation was worst for all defections. It was proven
that the initial density of cooperators had a negligible
impact on the escape efficiency during evacuation.
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